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1 Introduction 
Technological progress is the leading force of economic growth. For technological 
progress to occur basic research discoveries are necessary but not sufficient. The follow-up 
stage of development of an innovation is equally important. Often basic research is conducted 
in non-profitable institutions (e.g. universities, state research centres etc.) and its discoveries 
become available at some price. Their development is usually left to market forces that are 
motivated by their own interests. Bringing a new technology on line is costly for a firm. 
However, this cost may decline significantly as the development horizon becomes longer due 
to either economies of learning or basic research adoption process innovations. 
This paper studies the incentives to develop a new cost-reducing technology in a 
differentiated oligopolistic industry. Two firms, competing either in prices or in quantities 
in the product market, decide on when to adopt a new technology which is available to them 
at time O. Both firms initially have constant per unit cost of c. A firm that adopts the new 
technology reduces its per unit cost by A. The cost of purchasing and bringing the 
technology on line, which initially is prohibitively high for an immediate adoption to be 
profitable, falls significantly over time. Firms face symmetric linear demand conditions for 
their differentiated products. 
The existing literature (Reinganum (1981a&b, 1983), Fudenberg & Tirole (1985), 
Quirmbach (1986)) has focused on a homogeneous industry where typically firms compete 
in quantities. Reinganum (1981a, 1983) provides conditions under which the new technology 
is diffused over time in a duopoly with long information lags where each firm can safely 
precommit to a specific adoption date. Fudenberg & Tirole (1985) consider the opposite 
extreme where firms can observe and react instantaneously to their rivals' adoptions. Firms' 
profits are equalized in equilibrium because each firm adopts preemptively to prevent, or 
delay, adoption by its opponent. Quirmbach (1986) compares the diffusion rates in alternative 
specifications of the innovation market (given that firms compete in quantities in the product 
market) and shows that in a precommitment equilibrium the rate of diffusion is faster in 
market structure A than in B if and only if the incremental benefits of adopting the new 
technology are larger in A than in B. (Reinganum (1989) provides an excellent survey of 
the literature on the timing of adoption). 
We consider two alternative specifications of the product market, a price-setting and 
a quantity-setting game. By considering a differentiated industry we are able to explore the 
impact of product differentiation on the rate of diffusion of the new technology. Analyzing 
both the precommitment and the preemptive equilibria of the adoption game, we investigate 
the extent to which diffusion rates depend on the flexibility a firm has in altering its plans 
of implementation of the new technology. We compare the market diffusion rates with the 
second-best optimal rates, Le. when the social planner takes the product market structure as 
given. Also, the adoption timing patterns under Bertrand and Coumot competition are 
compared. By convention firm-l always adopts first, and firm-2 second. 
We find that under Coumot or Bertrand, in both precommitment and preemptive 
equilibria, for a sufficiently high degree of substitutability firm-2 adopts the new technology 
earlier in the market than it should optimally do. In a precommitment equilibrium, Cournot 
or Bertrand, firm-l alwa.ys adopts later than under the optimum. However, in a preemptive 
equilibrium this result can be reversed if the goods are sufficiently close substitutes. Note, 
the quantifier "sufficiently" in the results stated depends, both on the type of market 
competition and on the type of equilibrium of the adoption game. 
These results suggest that policy measures ought to be designed carefully to correct 
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the dynamic inefficiencies introduced by the market imperfections. In policy design all of the 
following factors should be taken into account: (i) the type of market competition, (H) the 
degree of product differentiation, (Hi) the degree of firm's flexibility to alter its adoption 
plans in response to its rival's past actions, (iv) the size of the market, and finally (v) how 
drastic the innovation is. Subsidizing the firm that adopts the new technology first turns out 
to be a welfare-improving measure only if altering the adoption plans is very costly. 
However, if these costs are low enough, taxing the new technology can improve welfare if 
the firm's good has sufficiently close substitutes in the market. On the other hand, 
subsidizing the firm that adopts second is welfare improving only if the goods are sufficiently 
poor substitutes. 
Finally, it is shown that in both precommitment and preemptive equilibria Cournot 
firm-2 always adopts earlier than Bertrand firm-2. Also, in a precommitment equilibrium 
Bertrand firm-I adopts earlier than its Cournot counterpart if the goods are sufficiently close 
substitutes. The opposite is true for lower values of substitutability. However, in a 
preemptive equilibrium Bertrand firm-l adopts always earlier than Cournot firm-I. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and outlines the 
basic assumptions. It also analyzes the per-period product market competition under cost 
asymmetries. In section 3 the second-best adoption timing pattern is derived. In section 4 
the adoption dates in a precommitment equilibrium are computed when firms are either 
competing a la Cournot or a la Bertrand in the product market. Section 5 compares the 
market adoption pattern against the optimal one; it also compares the adoption dates in a 
Cournot industry with those in a Bertrand. In sections 6 and 7 we derive the adoption dates 
in a preemptive equilibrium, and compare them with the optimal ones. Section 8 is the 
conclusion. 
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2 The Model 
We consider an economy with an oligopolistic sector, consisting of two firms that 
produce a differentiated good, and a competitive numeraire sector. The two firms operate 
under constant returns to scale and have initially the same unit cost of production c. At 1=0 
a cost reducing innovation is announced and offered for sale in the market. A firm can 
purchase the new technology at any 1~ 0 and reduce thereafter its unit cost to c-A, 0 < A <c. 
Let k(t) be the present value of the costs of purchasing and bringing the innovation on line 
at time t. Following Fudenberg & Tirole (1985) we assume that the "current cost" k(t)t!' is 
decreasing over time, at a decreasing rate, that is, (k(t)en), < 0 and (k(t)en) " >0, where r is 
the interest rate, 0 < r< 1. The costs can decline as the development horizon becomes longer 
due to either economies of learning or new results from basic research that facilitate the 
adoption process. Assume further that (a) lim,-f) k(t) =-lim,-o k'(f) =00. This is a sufficient 
condition for immediate adoption to be prohibitively costly under any circumstances; and (b) 
lim,04 a>k'(t)e" =0. This condition guarantees that all adoptions occur in finite time under all 
parameter constellations. The latter assumption is not crucial for our results; it only serves 
to avoid the complications which create corner solutions. Finally, we introduce a simplifying 
assumption that no further innovation is anticipated in the industry. 
The market operates every period f ~ O. The market demand structure is the same in 
each period t, and follows Dixit (1979). The representative consumer's utility over the two 
(non-durable) differentiated goods (Xl' x:J and the numeraire (non-durable) good m is given 
by 
U(XI, xzJ = a(xI + xzJ - (x/ + 2')'X1X1 + x/)12 + 111 (1) 
where a> c and 0 < ')' < 1. The assumption that utility is linear in the numeraire good 
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eliminates income effects and allows us to perform partial equilibrium analysis. The 
specification of U(.) generates a linear symmetric demand structure, 
PI = a - Xl - 1'X2 pz = a - x2 - 1'XI (2) 
which permits us to study how the adoption timing of the new technology depends upon the 
substitutability of the two goods. The latter is measured by the parameter 1'. As l' increases 
the goods become better substitutes, and for l' = 1 they are perfect substitutes. As l' goes to 
zero, each firm becomes virtually a monopolist for its product. 
We first analyze the case of Cournot competition. Given the demand system (2) and 
its own cost Cl' firm i chooses its quantity Xi to maximize profits [Pi - cJxi taking the quantity 
produced by its competitor xj as given. This results in the equilibrium quantities (x/, x2 c) 
where 
XjC(cj, cl = [2(a - cJ - 1'(a - cj )J/(4 - 1'2) i,j = ],2 (3) 
The adoption of the cost-reducing technology from firm i increases xjC and decreases xj c. 
This latter effect is strategically advantageous for firm i because from (2) its own price is 
negatively related with firm j's quantity. Thus quantity competition creates a positive 
strategic effect to innovate. To avoid corner solutions we restrict attention to the range of 
the substitutability parameter where both firms are active in the market. From (3), this is the 
case if and only if1'<1'c(~), where 1'c(~)= minI], 2(a-c)/(a-c+~)J. Finally, using the first 
order conditions, the per-period profits are given by 
'If/c(c/, cl = [xjC(Cj, cll i,j=],2 (3)' 
We next turn to the case of Bertrand competition. By inverting (2) we obtain the 
demand functions 
(4) 
Firm i chooses its price pj to maximize its profits [Pi - cJxi taking the competitor's price Pj 
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as fixed. This generates the equilibrium prices (p/, p/) given by 
pjB(Cj, c) = [(2+-y)(l--y)a + 2c; + -yc)/(4 - -y2) i,j = J,2 (5) 
When firm i adopts the cost-reducing technology both p;B and p/ decrease. The latter is 
disadvantageous for firm i, because its output is positively related with Pj' In contrast with 
Cournot, Bertrand competition creates a negative strategic effect. Now, does this imply that 
firms competing in prices always adopt the technology later than if they compete in 
quantities? As we will see, the answer is no. As in Bester & Petrakis (1993) there is an 
additional effect, the market share effect, which plays an important role. If the cost-reducing 
technology sharply increases its market share, there are stronger incentives for the firm to 
adopt the technology earlier since the cost reduction applies to a higher volume of 
production. 
As previously, we restrict ourselves to parameter values for which both firms operate 
in the market. This happens if and only if p/(c;, c) > c;. From (5) this holds if -y < -YB(~)' 
where -YB(~) is implicitly defined by -Y8(~) == -Yc(~)f2--y/(~)]l2. Thus -YB(~) < -Yc(~). Finally, 
using the first order conditions, the flow of profits is given by 
i,}=1,2 (5) , 
The Second-Best Adoption Pattern 
We first investigate the (second-best) optimal adoption pattern of the new technology 
from the viewpoint of social welfare. Let Vo'". V/"'. and V2"', be the per-period total welfare 
if none, only one, or both firms adopt the new technology in the market m. By convention 
firm-l always adopts first in the sequel. The social planner, taking the market structure as 
given, chooses the adoption pattern (T/"', T/"') so as to maximize 
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where Vom=V"(C,C) , Vt= V"(c-.1,c), and vt= V"(c-.1,c-.1) with 
(7) 
m can be either a Cournot (C) or a Bertrand market (B). The first order conditions from (6) 
determine the optimal adoption pattern according to 
V III v.'" _k'(T1sm)e,T1 
SOl 
1 - 0 = 
s..r 
TJ'III V'" -k'(TSm )e r 2 (8)
"2 - 1 = 2 
mLet 1/'"= vt-vo , and Il'"E vt-Vt be the social planner's incremental benefits from firm-
1 's, and -2's adoption respectively. Substituting (3) into (7) we obtain the incremental 
benefits in case that the firms compete a la Cournot 
I/C = .1 [2(3+-y)(a-c)(2--Yl+(l2-··/)t:.j/2(4-"/f (9) 
l/c = t:. [2(3+-y)(a-c)(2--Yl+(12-J6'Y·-yz+2-y3)t:.j/2(4.-yz/ (10) 
Further, substituting (5) into (4) and using (7) we obtain the corresponding expressions for 
the case of Bertrand competition 
I/B = .1[2(3-2-y)(a-c)(I-'Y)(2+-yf+ (l2-9"/+2'Y4)t:.j/2(J--yz)(4--yZj (11) 
IlB = .1[2(3-2-y)(a-c)(I--y)(2 +-y/ + (12-J6'Y-9...,z +6-y3 + 2-y4)t:.}I2(1--y2)(4--y2l (12) 
Then 1/'">0, i=1,2 and 1/'">lt·, m=B,C for all O<-y< 1 and .1>0. From (8), ~Sm
 
Sm smdepends only on Ij • It follows that T/'" < Tz as [-k '(Oe'? is decreasing in (. Hence diffusion 
of the new technology results from a pattern of decreasing incremental benefits as is pointed 
out in Quirmbach (1986). 
7 
4 The Precommitment Equilibrium 
In this section we study the "two-stage" game where at the beginning of their planning 
horizon firms precommit simultaneously to specific adoption dates. The firms then compete 
in the product market each period over an infinite horizon. In this context "adoption date" 
represents the time by which the adoption has been completed. To bring the new technology 
on line a firm often has to make long term plans. These plans can be altered later only at 
high expenses. Precommitment at time 0 is a time consistent behaviour only if the costs of 
altering the adoption plans are prohibitively high. That is, the threat of altering one's 
adoption date as a response to the rival's past actions is not credible. 
Let 7rom, 7rt be the per-period profits when none, or both firms have adopted the 
new technology. Also, 7rtm , 7rj be the per-period profits of the leader (firm that has already 
adopted), and the follower (that has not yet adopted), m=C,B. Then 7rom=7r'"(c,c), 
7rt=~(c-t:.,c-t:.), 7rt=7rt(c-t:.,c) and 7r./"=7r:tl (c-t:.,c}. At time 0 firm ;, ;=1,2 chooses r;m 
to maximize its discounted sum of profits 
II~(Tl' T2) (13) 
II~(Tl' T2) 
The first order conditions of (13) are as follows 
1t: - 1t~ = _k'(Tt)erTt' (14)
rTt1t~ - 1ti = _k'(Tt)e
Let It=7rt-7ro m , and It=7rt-7rp. I;'" is then firm i's incremental benefit from adoption in 
8 
,--------------------------------------,--
5 
the market m. Then from (3) and (3)' we obtain the incremental benefits of firm-I, and -2 
in the Cournot market 
lIe = 41JA[(a-c)(2--y)+IJA]/(4-'lf (15) 
1/ = 41JA[(a-c)(2--y)+IJA(1--y)]/(4--y2j (16) 
Also, from (5) and (5)' we get the corresponding expressions for the Bertrand market 
1/ = 1JA(2--y2)[2(a-c)(I·-y)(2+-y)+1JA(2-Y)]/(l·-y2)(4.-y2j (17) 
Il = 1JA(2--y2)[2(a-c)(I·-y)(2+-y)+1JA(2-y-2-y)]/(l-Y)(4.-y2/ (18) 
Thus It>O and It>It for all IJA>O and 0<-y<1 in both markets. Further, by (14) Tt 
depends only on It and by our assumption on k(.) we get T/m >T2m for m=B,C. As 
Quirmbach (1986) noted the diffusion of new technology in the market is not due to strategic 
behaviour, but rather to a pattern of decreasing incremental benefits. In addition, it becomes 
clear from (8) and (14) that to compare adoption timing in various contexts it is sufficient 
to compare their respective incremental benefits. This is the task of the following section. 
Adoption Timing in the Precommitment Equilibrium 
We start by comparing the (second-best) optimal adoption pattern with those evolving 
in the market. Surprisingly, the qualitative features of this comparison are similar for both 
markets, despite the fact that the adoption of technology creates a positive strategic effect in 
the Cournot market, while a negative strategic effect in the Bertrand market. Thus, 
independent of the market, we have 
Proposition 1: In a Precommitmenr equilibrium, 1'/m < 1'/', m = C,B,for all -y and IJA. Thus 
the Social Planner must always subsidize.fil711-J inrhe marker ({rhe cosrs ofalrering adoption 
plans are very high. 
9 
Proof: From (9) and (15), I/c >11C if and only if {2(l-"I)(a-c) +AjA/2(4·"/) > O. This is true 
for all 0<1'< 1 and A>O. Also, from (11) and (17), 1/8 >// if and only if {2(1-"I)(a-
c)+AjA/2(4.'Y2)(1·'Y2»O, which is again always true. Then (8) and (14) imply that T/'" < 
Tt, m=C, B, because -k'(t)e-n is decreasing in t. Q.E.D. 
Our first result says that firm-l always adopts the new technology too late in 
comparison with the optimal date of adoption. In the market firm-l cannot appropriate the 
full social surplus generated by the adoption, so it prefers to wait a little longer when the 
costs of bringing the new technology on line become lower. This is related to Dasgupta & 
Stiglitz (1980) observation that non-appropriability of social surplus leads to underinvestment 
relative to the social optimum. Thus, whenever there are significant costs for altering 
adoptions plans, subsidizing firm-I' s adoption is a welfare-improving policy regardless of 
the type of market competition. However, the optimal amount of the (lump-sum) subsidy 
depends on the type of competition, the degree of product differentiation (decreasing in "I), 
on how drastic the innovation is (increasing in A), and on the size of the market (increasing 
in a). 
Let 'YII(A) =(2(a-c)+A]/2(a-c+A). Then "III(A) < "If/(A) if A< 0.781 (a-c). This 
condition is satisfied whenever the market is not too small. Then firm-2 might adopt earlier 
or later than it is socially optimal depending on how close substitutes the goods are: 
Proposition 2: In a precommitment equilibrium, for each A<O. 781 (a-c) there is a 'Y'(A) 
such that T/"'< Tt ifl' < "I', and T/"' > Tt (f"l >"111, m=B,C. Moreover, 1'11(.) decreases with 
A. Thus the Social Planner has to tax finn-2 if the goods are close enough substitutes, but 
subsidize it otherwise, in case that the cost of affering adoption plans is very high. 
Proof: From (10) and (16), l/c >11c if and only if !(a-c) + (1-2"1)(a-c+A)jA/2(4·'Y2) >0, 
which is true for 'Y<'YII(A). Also, from (12) and (18), /,/8>// if and only if {(a-c)+(1-
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2"1)(a-c +t:&)]t:&/2(4.··/)(J.''l) >0, which is again true for "I < "I"(t:&). Then (8) and (14) imply 
that T/m <Tt if "I <"I'(t:&) , and T/nl >Tt' otherwise. Q.E.D. 
If the goods are sufficiently close substitutes, firm-2 adopts the new technology earlier 
in the market (Cournot or Bertrand) than in the optimum. The reverse, however, is true if 
the goods are poor substitutes. Surprisingly, the social planner does not have to look at the 
type of competition when choosing between taxing or subsidizing firm-2: the critical value 
of "I, "I', is the ~ for both markets. Yet, the optimal adoption tax/subsidy depends on the 
complete list of the parameters: market size, degree of differentiation, drasticity of 
innovation, and type of market competition. 
The intuition behind the above result is as follows. For low values of "I firm-2 is 
almost a monopolist in the market, so it cannot appropriate the full social surplus generated 
by the cost-reducing innovation. Thus it will wait relatively longer for the costs of bringing 
the innovation on line to decrease sufficiently to compensate for the part of social surplus 
which it cannot appropriate. 
However, if "I is sufficiently close to I'm' 111 =B, C firm-2 hardly produces anything 
before adoption. Given that almost all production is already done by firm-! with the low cost 
technology, and that the goods are close substitutes, the adoption of the innovation by firm-2 
increases the social surplus very little. The cost-reducing technology would only apply to a 
tiny production share which firm-2 had. On the other hand, innovation increases significantly 
firm-2 ' s share in the market, thus creating a strong incentive to adopt the new technology 
earlier. This business-stealing effect dominates the non-appropriability effect for "I 
sufficiently high and so firm-2 in the market adopts earlier than in the second-best optimum. 
A better insight on why the critical value of "I, "I", is the same in both markets despite 
the fact that the strategic effects work in opposite directions (positive in quantity competition, 
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but negative in price competition) can be gained by comparing the adoption timing pattern 
of Cournot and Bertrand markets. Let .y(~)= 2(a-c)/[2(a-c)+~J. It can be easily checked 
that 1(~) < 'YB(~) for all ~. We have the following result: 
Proposition 3: Let "I < 'YB(~)' Then in a precommitmenr equilibrium 
(i) For each ~ there is a .y(~) such that T/ <T/ for "I <.y and T/ > T/ for "I> .y. 
Moreover, 1(.) is decreasing in ~. 
c(ii) T2 < T/ for all "I. 
Proof: From (15) and (17), llc>l/ifand only if [(2-'Y)(a-c)-'Y(a-c+~)]1~/(1-'Y2)(4-'Y2j>O,
 
or equivalently if (a-c)/(a-c+~) >"1/(2-"1), which is true if "I < .y(~). Also from (16) and (18), 
1/> 12Bif and only if [2(1-'Y)(a-c)+(2-'Y)~Jl~/(1-'Y2)(4-y/>Owhich is true always. Then 
by (14) we obtain the result. Q.E.D. 
The intuition for part (i) is that for low values of "I the difference in the strategic 
effect under Cournot and Bertrand competition is dominant. While as "I increases the market 
share effect (Bester & Petrakis (1993» becomes more important. In fact, when the two 
commodities are poor substitutes their demands are hardly related, so a firm's output hardly 
differs in the two types of market. Thus total cost reduction due to adoption is of the same 
magnitude in both Bertrand and Cournot markets. However, for low values of 'Y the 
innovation is more profitable for a Cournot fi rm-l because it decreases firm-2' s output 
whereas for a Bertrand firm-l it decreases its competitor's price. Therefore a Bertrand firm-
1 will adopt in a later moment when the costs of bringing the technology on line are lower. 
On the other hand, when the goods are very close substitutes, a cost-reducing 
innovation has a significant impact on the firm's market share. Especially, if "I is close 
enough to 'YB(~)' adoption of the new technology from firm-l reduces firm-2's market 
share to almost zero. In Cournot competition firm-2 's reduction of market share is much 
12 
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less drastic, because 'YB(fj,,) < 'Ydfj,,) implies that firm-2 has a "decent" market share even after 
firm-l 's innovation. Therefore for high values of'Y the Bertrand market creates a stronger 
incentive for firm-l to innovate than the Cournot market. The market share effect dominates 
and firm-l adopts earlier in price competition. 
Part (ii) of Proposition 3 tells us that a Cournot firm-2 always adopts earlier than its 
Bertrand counterpart. The strategic effect dominates the market share effect for all 
substitutability values. For low values of'Y the intuition is given above. But for high 'Y it is 
the strength of price competition which diminishes the market share effect. Firm-2's after-
adoption profits do not increase much, even if its market share do increase a lot. This is due 
to the fierce competition between firms that are producing very similar goods. The after-
innovation competition is much softer for a Cournot firm-2, thus its profits increase 
sufficiently despite the fact that its market share increases much less than Bertrand firm- 2 ·s. 
The Preemptive Equilibrium 
If adoption is perfectly observable and instantaneous, and if the costs of altering 
adoption plans are not significant (Fudenberg & Tirole (1983», a firm cannot credibly 
commit to maintain its adoption date regardless of what happened in the past. In a 
precommitment equilibrium firm-l that innovates first makes higher profits than firm-2 that 
adopts later. However, if preemption is possible this cannot happen. Firm-2 would have 
incentive to adopt the new technology just before firm-l in order to increase its profits. 
Firm-I, facing preemption, will then innovate at an earlier moment such that firm-2 is 
indifferent between adopting just before that moment and adopting much later. Thus, in a 
preemptive equilibrium the Rent EqualizaTion Principle holds. 
The specification of the game is the same as section 4 except that history matters. As 
a result we need to look for time consistent innovative behaviour. Once firm-l has adopted 
the new technology, firm-2's adoption is a one-player decision problem. it chooses Tt to 
maximize its profits llt(Tl' T~ (given in (13» with the only restriction that Tt'?!. T/". The 
first-order condition of this problem is the same as in the precommitment equilibrium, and 
is given by (14) with Tt replacing Tt. Given our assumption that firm-2 always adopts 
later, this implies that in both a preemptive and a precommitment equilibrium firm-2 adopts 
the same time, Le. Tt=Tt for m = C,B. 
From the Rent Equalization Principle we determine T/' by equating the discounted 
sum of profits, Le. ll/"(T/",Tz'"j=llt(r/", rt). From (13) and after some manipulations we 
get 
(19) 
where 7(',''' and 7rt are the leader's and follower's flow of profits. respectively, in market m, 
m=C,B. Note, given rz'"=Tt firm-l 's optimal adoption date depends only on the differential 
of the per-period profits of being the leader and being the follower. Following Katz & 
Shapiro (1987), we call this firm-l 's preemprive incenrive. A comparison of the preemptive 
incentives created by Bertrand and Cournot markets are given in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4: For all -y < -YB(.~) ,he preemprive incentives in Benrand and Cournot markets 
are equal. i.e. 7rtC - 7rf = 7r,B - 7rJ. 
cProof: Using (3), (3)', (5) and (5)', we have 7rr - 7rf = /2(a-cj+AjAI(4.-y2j = T,B- T/. 
Q.E.D. 
This result seems to be specific to the linear demand structure. Nevertheless, it suggests that 
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the preemptive incentives in Cournot and Bertrand competition are often of similar magnitude 
in a broader class of demand conditions. The intuition is that for fixed ')', the Bertrand market 
is more competitive than the Cournot market. This suggests a larger profit differential 
between the low-cost leader and the high-cost follower in the Bertrand market. However, 
the leader's adoption generates positive externalities for the follower in the Bertrand market, 
but negative externalities in the Cournot market. The latter counterbalances the 
competitiveness effect. 
7 Adoption Timing in the Preemptive Equilibrium 
From the previous section we know that firm-2 adopts at the same time in both the 
precommitment and the preemptive equilibria. In section 5 we found that 
(i) Coumot fiml-2 always adopts earlier than its Bertrand counterpart, and 
(ii) For sufficiently high values of')' finn-2 in the market adopts earlier than in the second 
best optimum. The reverse is true for low values of substitutability. 
Let us first compare firm-l 's optimal adoption date in a price-setting and a quantity-
setting game. Let, 
(20) 
Proposition S: In a preemptive equilibrium, T/ < T/ for all ')' and ~.
 
Proof: Let g(t) =k(t)e". By assumption g(t) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex. 
Differentiating (20) we have 
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(21) 
By strict convexity of exp(x) we have exp[r(t2-t])]-J > r(t2-t]). As g(l) is decreasing and strictly 
convex, the right hand term of (21) in square brackets [..] < r{g '(ll )(t2-1l ) + (g(ll )-g(Iz))} <O. 
ThUS,/(ll , lz) is decreasing in I l • and in t2 by the symmetry of (20). Hence, "l>"zc implies 
/(ll , "l) < /(ll • "zc). Then from (19) and proposition 4 we have ,,/< "lC, Q.E.D. 
Firm-l in a Bertrand market always adopts the new technology earlier than its 
counterpart in a Cournot market. In fact, firm-l under price competition enjoys the 
leadership longer than under quantity competition. Given that the preemptive incentives per-
period are the same in both markets, firm-l has a stronger overall incentive to preempt in 
a Bertrand than in a Cournot market. 
Finally, we compare firm-I' s adoption decision in the market with the second-best 
optimum. We know that for m= C,B, 
?rIm -?rt = ~[2(a - c) + ~]1(4 - '/J (22) 
Hence firm-I' s preemptive incentive increases as the two goods become better substitutes. 
Further, from (16) and (18), 12m is decreasing in ')' for all ~ in Bertrand and for sufficiently 
high ~ in Cournot competition. This implies that Tt is typically increasing in "'t. The closer 
substitutes the two goods are, the later firm-2 adopts the new technology in the market. This 
in turn implies that/(t,.) decreases with')' and given that the preemptive incentives increase 
with ')', firm-l adopts earlier as the goods become better substitutes. On the other hand, l/m 
is decreasing in "'t for all ~ in Bertrand and for small enough ~ in Cournot. Thus as the 
goods become closer substitutes the social planner usually postpones adoption for later. The 
above analysis leads us to the following conjecture: Firm-l in the market may adopt earlier 
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than in the second-best optimum when the goods are sufficiently close substitutes and the 
innovation is sufficiently drastic. This is in fact the case as the following example show. 
Example 1: Let k(lj=e-(a+r)l, where a=2 and r=.1. Let a=lO, c=4. If -y=.9 and ~=.S, 
then the optimal adoption pattern in case that firms compete a la Cournot is T/c=0.lS3, 
T/C=0.2l4, while firm-I, and -2 adopt the new technology at 1/=0.204 and T/=0.237 
respectively in the precommitment market equilibrium. In the preemptive market equilibrium, 
however, firm-l adopts immediately (r/c=O). A similar result holds for the Bertrand market: 
T/B=0.036, T/B=0.237, while in the precommitment equilibrium T/=0.2578 and 
T/=0.383. Again firm-l adopts immediately (r/=O) in the preemptive equilibrium. Note, 
that adoption in period 0 results here because our assumption that immediate adoption is 
prohibitively costly does not hold. 
8 Conclusion 
By studying a differentiated oligopolistic industry where firms compete either in prices 
or in quantities, this paper increases our understanding on how product market competition 
influences the private and public incentives to adopt a new technology. It develops a 
framework where market adoption timing patterns can be compared with the (second-best) 
optimal patterns. This provides further insights for the design of a technology policy aiming 
at correcting the inefficiencies of the laissez-faire. The degree of product differentiation turns 
out to be an important factor in this comparison. For example, subsidizing the firm that 
adopts second is a welfare-improving policy ifits commodity has only poor substitutes in the 
market, while taxing adoption is optimal otherwise. An equally important factor is the firm's 
flexibility to alter its adoption plans as a reaction to its rival's past actions. If the goods are 
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good substitutes, the policymaker may have to tax the first firm that innovates in case that 
the costs of altering adoption plans is low, but to subsidize it if the firm can precommit to 
a specific adoption date. 
In addition, it is shown that the optimal tax/subsidy on the adoption of a new 
technology is very sensitive to all market parameters. The type of competition (Bertrand or 
Cournot), the demand conditions (e.g. size of the market), the drasticity of the innovation 
and the rate of decrease of adoption costs, besides the ones mentioned above, have to be 
taken into account while designing technology policy. Some other factors, not considered 
in this paper, but which have been shown in the literature to be equaIly important for the 
technology policy are: Uncertainty about the innovation's profitability or the length of time 
required for its successful implementation (Reinganum (l983a, 1983b), Stenbacka & Tombak 
(1994)), price and entry regulations (Riordan(l992)), and possibilities of imitation and 
licensing (Katz & Shapiro(1987)). Introducing one or more of these factors into our more 
general framework will provide further insights into the design of the technology policy, a 
task left for future research. 
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